Ever since the U.S. Supreme Court decided
in June that “same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry in
all States” and “there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a
lawful same-sex marriage performed in another State on the ground of its
same-sex character”, media outlets have been reporting regularly on bakeries
and other establishments being fined or sued for refusing to provide services to
same-sex couples (Oregon;
Louisiana;
Colorado). Obergefell
v. Hodges, No. 14–556, slip op. at 28 (U.S. 2015). So the question naturally follows: do Florida
businesses have the right to refuse service to same-sex couples solely because
they are members of the same sex? For
the reasons below, it is my conclusion that current Florida and federal law does
not include sexual orientation or same-sex marriage as protected classes under
their respective civil rights acts. Neither
Florida law nor federal law specifically mandates that same-sex couples be provided
services without discrimination. Likewise, Florida and federal
law does not affirmatively protect businesses seeking to discriminate against
same-sex couples.
Businesses,
however, should proceed with extreme caution.
In addition to the charter counties that have passed their own civil
rights protections against discrimination based on sexual orientation (Orange
County Ord. 22-42; Miami-Dade
County Ord. Sec. 11A-19; etc.), federal law (if it were to change) may apply if the business is
engaged in interstate commerce. Further,
this issue is an emerging issue that is certainly going to be debated by both
the judiciary and the legislature in the coming months. As such, the law will be very fluid and is
subject to rapid change in the coming year.
Florida Civil Rights Act Applicability Generally
The Florida
Civil Rights Act of 1992 (FCRA) was enacted to establish state civil rights
“for all individuals within the state freedom from discrimination because of
race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or
marital status and thereby to protect their interest in personal dignity, to
make available to the state their full productive capacities, to secure the
state against domestic strife and unrest, to preserve the public safety,
health, and general welfare, and to promote the interests, rights, and
privileges of individuals within the state.”
Fla. Stat. § 760.01(2) (2015).
Notice the absence of the language sexual
orientation. Comparable civil rights
acts in other states specifically include that language (as do the charter
county ordinances above). For comparison,
the Colorado
statute specifically includes sexual
orientation and marital status. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-601 (2014). The Colorado court decision linked in the initial
paragraph of this blog imposed a civil fine on a bakery specifically because of
their state’s statute; there is no comparable language in FCRA.
Under
the expressio
unius est exclusio alterus canon of statutory interpretation, Florida courts
can be expected to hold that the inclusion of several protected classes in FCRA
necessarily excludes those classes not listed.
Further, the Florida Legislature just added a new class to FCRA this
past legislative session (pregnancy).
2015 Fla. Laws Chapter 2015-68. Florida
courts will be reluctant to read a new class for sexual orientation into FCRA
given that the Legislature just debated the area.
FCRA
does create an autonomous Commission on Human Relations who receives all
initial claims of discrimination from aggrieved parties. Fla. Stat. §760.03–07 (2015). The Commission has a broad charge to “promote
and encourage fair treatment and equal opportunity for all persons regardless
of… religion… sex… or marital status and mutual understanding and respect among
all members of all economic, social, racial, religious, and ethnic groups; and
shall endeavor to eliminate discrimination against, and antagonism between,
religious, racial, and ethnic groups and their members.” Fla. Stat. §760.05 (2015). While the Commission could conceivably be a
catalyst for convincing the Legislature to broaden existing restrictions on
public accommodations, sexual orientation is again notably absent from the list
of protected parties.
For
FCRA to apply, the Commission must make a reasonable cause finding of a
violation of FCRA. Fla. Stat. §760.11(4)
(2015). Upon such a finding, the
complainant can elect to proceed to state court or have an administrative
hearing. Fla. Stat. §760.11 (2015). Places of public accommodation are covered by
FCRA. Fla. Stat. §760.08 (2015). Those places include “lodgings, facilities
principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises, gasoline
stations, places of exhibition or entertainment, and other covered
establishments.” Fla. Stat. §760.11(11)
(2015). The statute goes on to list
examples such as hotels, motels, restaurants, on-premises food providers,
theaters, sports arenas, and stadiums. Id.
Even
if a business is a “public accommodation” under FCRA, a violation exists only
when that business discriminates on the basis of “race, color, national origin,
sex, pregnancy, handicap, familial status, or religion.” Fla. Stat. §760.08 (2015). Again, sexual
orientation is conspicuously absent.
Therefore, FCRA does not penalize a business for discriminating on the
basis of sexual orientation.
Regulation of Florida’s Lodging Establishments &
Restaurants
It comes as no surprise that Florida’s hotels and
restaurants are regulated in other areas of Florida law other than FCRA. Thus, an examination of these regulations is
also required before reaching the conclusion that discrimination based on
sexual orientation or same-sex marriage status is not actionable under present
law.
Oversimplified for space, Florida law regulates hotels,
motels, restaurants, and places where food is “prepared, served, or sold for
immediate consumption on or in the vicinity of the premises; called for or
taken out by customers; or prepared prior to being delivered to another
location for consumption.” Fla. Stat. §509.013(5)(a)
(2015). Exclusions include fraternal
orders, common carriers (places, trains, ferries), hospital cafeterias, farms,
theater snack bars, and vending machines.
Fla. Stat. §509.013(5)(b) (2015).
It is here, for the first time in this analysis, that the hypothetical
wedding bakery popularized by the media is first implicated.
Florida public
lodging establishments and public
food establishments, as defined, have “the right to refuse accommodations
or service to any person who is objectionable or undesirable to the operator,
but such refusal may not be based upon race, creed, color, sex, pregnancy,
physical disability, or national origin. A person aggrieved by a violation of
this section or a violation of a rule adopted under this section has a right of
action pursuant to [FCRA].” Fla. Stat. §509.092
(2015). Again, there is a conspicuous
absence of sexual orientation as a
protected class. Under the FCRA analysis
above, I come to the same conclusion: Florida’s regulatory scheme affecting
hotels, motels, restaurants, bakeries, and the like does not preclude
discrimination of same-sex couples based on sexual orientation or the same-sex
nature of their marriage.
The prudent lodging or restaurant operator should be
mindful of posting any restrictions against providing services to same-sex
couples in accordance with Fla. Stat. §509.101(1)
(2015) [English language, prominent posting, etc.] and should be mindful of the
ejection/refusal of admission requirements of Fla. Stat. §509.141
& 509.142
(2015).
Federal Law
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 entitles people to the full
and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages,
and accommodations of any place of public accommodation… without discrimination
or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. §2000a. The covered establishments mirror the
requirements of FCRA [hotels, motels, restaurants, on-premises food, theaters,
etc.]. Id. In order for the federal
law to apply, a business must be primarily engaged in the business of
interstate commerce [even minimal contacts or potential contacts with
out-of-state customers or must be supplying services to the State
government. Id. This is purposefully
broad and has been interpreted as broadly as possible by the U.S. Supreme
Court. Suffice to say, federal law would
cover the vast majority of businesses providing services to the public.
Again, there is a conspicuous absence of sexual orientation or same-sex couple from the protected
classes. Therefore, I come to the same
conclusion as above: federal law does not preclude a business from refusing to
provide services to a couple based on their sexual orientation or the same-sex
nature of their marriage.
Strong Caveats
Lest Florida businesses run out and begin openly
discriminating against same-sex couples without fear, let me provide the following
advice. First, it is no small point that
the U.S. Supreme Court has found a fundamental
right for members of the same sex to marry. Fundamental rights are among the most bedrock
principles protected by the U.S. Constitution.
Many states have found a fundamental right to be protected by
the government from discrimination based on sexual orientation. The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission has already found it illegal for an employer to discriminate against a worker based
on transgender, lesbian, gay, or bisexual identification. Veretto v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC
Appeal No. 0120110873 (July 1, 2011),http://www.eeoc.gov/decisions/0120110873.txt; Castello
v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 0520110649 (Dec. 20, 2011),http://www.eeoc.gov/decisions/0520110649.txt;
Macy v. Department of Justice, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821 (April 20,
2012),http://www.eeoc.gov/decisions/0120120821%20Macy%20v%20DOJ%20ATF.txt. It is highly likely that the U.S. Supreme Court
will consider whether gender identification and/or sexual orientation should be
protected by the government from discrimination as a class (similar to race and
national origin protections).
Second, Florida law does not preclude charter
counties (basically the largest counties in the state with some exception; see
this table)
from passing ordinances precluding businesses from discriminating against
people based on their sexual orientation or the same-sex nature of their
marriage. I listed two county ordinances
above as examples; there are others who have passed or are considering to pass
similar ordinances.
Finally, this issue is certain to gain traction for
debate and change in Florida. Just this
month, a Longwood, FL bakery was targeted
by an opponent of same-sex marriage for their refusal to print “We do not
support gay marriage” on a cake. I think
that the incident was the first of many to come in Florida.
Conclusion
In sum, while local laws by Florida charter counties may
preclude businesses operating within the county from doing so, Florida law and
federal law are silent as to whether businesses can refuse to provide services to
couples solely because of their sexual orientation or the same-sex nature of their
marriage. Businesses that choose to
discriminate against same-sex couples in non-charter counties or in counties whose
laws are silent on the issue do so at their own risk. The issue is certain to attract more debate
and interest in the coming months as the issue increases in visibility and
businesses and couples alike seek to force courts to consider the issue
directly.
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